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Abstract 
The .NET Framework is a managed type-safe environment for application development and execution. The 
.NET Framework manages all aspects of your program's execution, it allocates memory for the storage of data 
and instructions, grants or denies the appropriate permissions to your application, initiates and manages 
application execution, and manages the reallocation of memory from resources that are no longer needed.  
 
1. Introduction  
The .NET Framework. Development platform introduces many new concepts, technologies, and terms. The goal 
of this research is to give an overview of the .NET Framework to show how it is architected, to introduce some 
of the new technologies, and to define many of the new terms. If you decided to use the .NET Framework as 
your development platform, the first step is to determine what type of application or component you intend to 
build. After that you must decide what programming language to use [1]. This is usually a difficult task because 
different languages offer different capabilities. For example, in unmanaged C/C++, you have pretty low-level 
control of the system. You can manage memory exactly the way you want to, create threads easily if you need to, 
and so on. Visual Basic 6, on the other hand, allows you to build UI applications very rapidly and allows the 
easy control of COM objects and databases. 
 
2. Architecture of the .NET Framework 
The .NET Framework is an integral Windows component that supports building and running the next generation 
of applications and XML Web services. The .NET Framework is designed to fulfill the following objectives [1, 4, 
and 8]:- 
• To provide a consistent object-oriented programming environment whether object code is stored and executed 
locally, executed locally but Internet-distributed, or executed remotely. 
• To provide a code-execution environment that minimizes software deployment and versioning conflicts. 
• To make the developer experience consistent across widely varying types of applications, such as Windows-
based applications and Web-based applications. 
• To build all communication on industry standards to ensure that code based on the .NET Framework can 
integrate with any other code. 
If you use the .NET Framework, your code targets the common language runtime (CLR), which affects 
your decision about a programming language. The common language runtime is just what its name says it is: A 
runtime that is usable by different and varied programming languages. The features of the CLR are available to 
any and all programming languages that target it period. If the runtime uses exceptions to report errors, then all 
languages get errors reported via exceptions. If the runtime allows you to create a thread, then any language can 
create a thread. In fact, at runtime, the CLR has no idea which programming language the developer used for the 
source code. This means that you should choose whatever programming language allows you to express your 
intentions most easily.  
Regardless of which compiler you use, the result is a managed module. A managed module is a 
standard Windows Portable Executable (PE) file that requires the CLR to execute. In the future, other operating 
systems may use the PE file format as well. A Managed Module is composed of the following parts [2, 3]: 
• PE Header :- This is the standard Windows PE file header, which is similar to the Common Object File 
Format (COFF) header. The PE header indicates the type of file -GUI, CUI, or DLL- and also has a 
timestamp indicating when the file was built.  
• CLR header :- This header contains the information (interpreted by the CLR and utilities) that makes 
this a managed module. It includes the version of the CLR required, some flags, and the location/size of 
the module’s metadata, resources, strong name, some flags, and other less interesting stuff. 
• Metadata :- Every managed module contains metadata tables, of which there are two main types: those 
that describe the types and members defined in your source code, and those that describe the types and 
members referenced by your source code.  
• Intermediate Language (IL) Code :- This is the code that was produced by the compiler as it compiled 
the source code. IL is later compiled by the CLR into native CPU instructions.  
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In brief, metadata is simply a set of data tables that describe what is defined in the module, such as types and 
their members. In addition, metadata also has tables indicating what the managed module references, such as 
imported types and their members. Metadata is a superset of older technologies such as type libraries and IDL 
files. Metadata has many uses. Here are some of them [3]:- 
1. Metadata removes the need for header and library files when compiling, because all the information 
about the referenced types/members is contained in one file along with the IL that implements those 
type/members.  
2. The CLR code verification process uses metadata to ensure that your code performs only “safe” 
operations.  
3. Metadata allows the garbage collector to track the lifetime of objects. For any object, the garbage 
collector can determine the type of the object, and from the metadata it knows which fields within that 
object refer to other objects. 
 
3. Loading the Common Language Runtime 
Each assembly that you build can either be an executable application or a DLL containing a set of types 
(components) for use by an executable application. The CLR is responsible for managing the execution of code 
contained within these assemblies. This means that the .NET Framework must be installed on the host machine. 
Microsoft has created a redistribution package that you can freely ship to install the .NET Framework on your 
customer's machines. Future versions of Windows will include the .NET Framework, at which point you will no 
longer need to ship it with your assemblies.  
You can tell whether the .NET Framework has been installed by looking for the MSCorEE.dll file in 
the %windir%\system32 directory. The existence of this file tells you that the .NET Framework is installed [4]. 
However, several versions of the .NET Framework may be installed on a single machine simultaneously. If you 
want to determine exactly which versions of the .NET Framework are installed, examine the sub keys under the 
following registry key:  
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\.NET Framework\policy 
When you build an EXE assembly, the compiler/linker emits some special information into the resulting 
assembly's PE File header and the file's .text section. When the EXE file is invoked, this special information 
causes the CLR to load and initialize. Then the CLR locates the entry point method for the application and lets 
the application start executing.  
 
4. Executing the Code in Your Assembly 
Managed modules contain both metadata and intermediate language (IL) code. IL is a CPU-independent machine 
language created by Microsoft after consultation with several external commercial and academic 
language/compiler writers. IL is much higher-level than most CPU machine languages. IL understands object 
types and has instructions that create and initialize objects, call virtual methods on objects, and manipulate array 
elements directly. It even has instructions that throw and catch exceptions for error handling. You can think of IL 
as an object-oriented machine language. Usually, developers prefer to program in a high-level language, such as 
C# or Visual Basic.NET [5].  
Any high-level language will most likely expose only a subset of the facilities offered by the CLR. IL 
assembly language, however, gives a developer access to all the facilities of the CLR. So if your programming 
language of choice hides a CLR feature that you really wish to take advantage of, you can write that portion of 
your code in IL assembly or in another programming language that exposes the CLR feature you seek. The only 
way for you to know what facilities are offered by the runtime is to read documentation specific to the CLR itself.  
An important thing to note about IL is that it is not tied to any specific CPU platform. This means that a managed 
module containing IL can run on any CPU platform as long as the operating system running on that CPU 
platform hosts a version of the CLR.  
 
5. The .NET Framework Class Library 
Included with the .NET Framework is a set of Framework Class Library (FCL) assemblies that contains several 
thousand type definitions, where each type exposes some functionality. All in all, the CLR and the FCL allow 
developers to build the following kinds of applications [4, and 6]  
• Web Services. Components that can be accessed over the Internet very easily. Web services are, of 
course, the main thrust of Microsoft's .NET initiative. 
• Web Forms. HTML-based applications (web sites). Typically, web form applications make database 
queries and web service calls, combine and filter the returned information, and then present that 
information in a browser using a rich HTML-based UI. Web forms provide a Visual Basic 6- and 
InterDev-like development environment for web applications written in any CLR language. 
• Windows Forms. Rich Windows GUI applications. Instead of using a web form to create your 
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application's UI, you can use the more powerful, higher-performance functionality offered by the 
Windows desktop. Windows form applications can take advantage of controls, menus, mouse and 
keyboard events, and can talk directly to the underlying operating system.  
• Windows Console Applications. For applications with very simple UI demands, a console application 
provides a quick and easy solution. Compilers, utilities, and tools are typically implemented as console 
applications. 
 
6. The Common Type System 
Types expose functionality to your applications and components. Types are the mechanism by which code 
written in one programming language can talk to code written in a different programming language. Because 
types are at the root of the CLR, Microsoft created a formal specification –the common type system (CTS)-that 
describes how types are defined and behave. 
The CTS specification states that a type may contain zero or more members. A brief introduction to 
Type Member can be explained here [6]:  
1. Field. A data variable that is part of the object’s state. Fields are identified by their name and type. 
2. Method. A function that performs an operation on the object, often changing the object’s state. Methods 
have a name, signature, and modifiers. The signature specifies the calling convention, number of 
parameters (and their sequence), the types of the parameters, and the type of value returned by the 
method. 
3. Property. To the caller, this member looks like a field. But to the type implementer, this member looks 
like a method (or two). Properties allow an implementer to validate input parameters and object state 
before accessing the value and to calculate a value only when necessary; they also allow a user of the 
type to have simplified syntax. 
4. Event. A notification mechanism between an object and other interested objects. 
 
7. The Common Language Specification 
If you intend to create types that are easily accessible from other programming languages, then it is important 
that you use only features of your programming language that are guaranteed to be available in all other 
languages. To help you with this, Microsoft has defined a common language specification (CLS) that details for 
compiler vendors the minimum set of features that their compilers must support if they are to target the runtime. 
Note that the CLR/CTS supports a lot more features than the subset defined by the common language 
specification, so if you don’t care about language interoperability, you can develop very rich types limited only 
by the capabilities of the language. 
 
8. Interoperability with Unmanaged Code 
The CLR supports three interoperability [7]:- 
1. Managed code can call an unmanaged function in a DLL. Managed code can easily call functions 
contained in DLLs using a mechanism called P/Invoke (for Platform Invoke). After all, many of the types 
defined in the FCL internally call functions exported from Kernel32.dll, User32.dll, and so on. Many 
programming languages will expose a mechanism that makes it easy for managed code to call out to unmanaged 
functions contained in DLLs. 
Example: A C# or VB application can call the Create Semaphore function exported from Kernel32.dll. 
2. Managed code can use an existing COM component (server). Many companies have already 
implemented a number of unmanaged COM components. Using the type library from these components, a 
managed assembly can be created that describes the COM component. Managed code can access the type in the 
managed assembly just like any other managed type.  
Example: Using DirectX COM components from a C# or VB application. 
3. Unmanaged code can use a managed type (server). A lot of existing unmanaged code requires that you 
supply a COM component for the code to work correctly. You can implement these components easily using 
managed code, avoiding all the code that has to do with reference counting and interfaces.  
Example: Creating an ActiveX control or a shell extension in C# or VB. 
 
9. The Security of .NET Framework 
Many computer security issues can arise from unintentional behavior of computer programs. This unintentional 
behavior can result from several types of issues; mainly buffer over-flows, input validation errors and faulty 
default configurations [1 and 6]. 
Buffer overflows are caused when a process attempts to access a part of memory which is either not part 
of the process memory space, or is not part of the process memory which it expects it to be. Examples of this are 
situations when a process accidentally overwrites a value on the heap, causing corruption of the process variables, 
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or when a process overwrites a value on the process stack, causing diversion of the execution to an unintended 
piece of code. 
Input validation errors are caused when a process does not parse its input strictly enough, causing the 
process to behave abnormally. An example of this is when a process takes a file name as an argument, but does 
not check that the file name is for a valid file for the context. This could lead to overwriting of important system 
files, and is known as a luring attack. 
Default configurations of software often make broad assumptions about the target computer sys tem. 
This can lead to poor securing of confidential information, as well as abnormal execution of the software.  
 
10. Code Access Security CAS 
CAS is one of the fundamental principles behind the .NET Framework. Traditional software execution security 
has centered on the identity of the user who is running the software, rather than the identity of the code that is 
being run. The CAS system in .NET serves three purposes [9]: 
• “Authenticate code identity” When presented with an assembly, the Framework should be able to 
verify where the assembly is being run from (i.e. URL) and where it originates from (through Strong 
Naming). The information used to authenticate the code is referred to as evidence. 
• “Authorize code, not users, to access resources” Permissions to access files, devices, network 
resources etc. are granted based on the evidence presented about an assembly and the security policy in 
place. This allows a system to restrict an assembly loaded from the Internet to only access certain local 
resources. It is important to note that permissions granted based on code identity cannot override 
permissions based on user identity. That is, if the user running an assembly does not have access to a 
specific resource, access to that resource will not be granted based on the identity of the assembly, even 
if the security policy allows it.  
• “Enforce the authorization decisions on particular pieces of code, not users” There is no point in 
granting and refusing permissions to an assembly if these are not enforced. The CAS system must 
ensure policies are not breached, and that assemblies are not given access to resources they have not 
been granted permission to access. It is important to note that the .NET runtime environment also 
enforces permissions based on user permission policies. The environment supports traditional user-
based access control as well as role-based access control.  
 
11. Evidence 
Evidence is information that authenticates an assembly or Application Domain. Permissions to access resources 
are granted based on the evidence available, so it is important that the evidence can be provided by the assembly 
that wishes to execute, or the host under which it will be executed. In this context, a host is not a physical 
computer, but a process which invokes the CLR or loads a piece of managed code. A host can either be 
unmanaged or managed. An unmanaged host is a process which invokes the CLR. Microsoft .NET currently 
ships with several unmanaged hosts: a web browser (Internet Explorer), a server side scripting environment 
(ASP.NET), a command line host and more. Unmanaged hosts like these cannot directly load and inspect 
assemblies, but must invoke the CLR which will take care of code loading and execution. As a consequence, 
unmanaged hosts can not provide evidence on an assembly, but can only provide evidence on an Application 
Domain. 
A managed host is a piece of managed code which can load other managed code. Such a host requires specific 
security permissions to be granted. This makes sense, so that arbitrary code loaded from an un-trusted site on the 
Internet can not act as a host and control execution. Managed hosts can provide evidence both on Application 
Domains and assemblies. Classes are provided in the BCL to create new Application Domains and load 
assemblies, plus providing evidence for these instantiations. Evidence comes in various forms, and custom 
evidence can be provided by developers if needed. 
 
12. Permissions 
In .NET, permissions act as a prerequisite for an assembly to access a certain resource. A piece of code cannot 
access any resources, or even execute, unless it has been granted a permission to do so by the security policy. 
Permissions are used in three different ways. They can be [3, 8]: 
• Granted by the security policy. 
• Demanded by.NET assemblies. 
• Used for other security actions. 
Based on the evidence presented by the assembly and runtime, the security manager can grant permissions to an 
assembly that complies with the security policy in place. More can be found about this in the next section. Each 
assembly is granted a collection of permissions, known as a permission set. These sets can be combined using set 
unions, which becomes useful when resolving permissions based on security policy. 
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A security policy does not need to be fine grained, specifying what permissions a specific set of evidence should 
yield. This could be quite time consuming, although slightly more efficient than specifying permissions based on 
the exact identity of an assembly. Instead, assemblies are grouped together in code groups, based on their 
common evidence, or membership conditions. This is explained in more detail in the section below on code 
groups [7]. To make policy management easier, there is not just one flat security policy for all assemblies 
running on a computer. There are in fact four different policy levels which interact to create the specific security 
policy relevant to a CLR instance. To make policy management easier, there is not just one flat security policy 
for all assemblies running on a computer. There are in fact four different policy levels which interact to create 
the specific security policy relevant to a CLR instance. This is explained more closely in the next section on 
policy levels. 
 
14. Policy Levels 
The .NET Framework does not operate with only one security policy. It has in fact four different policy levels, 
so as to accommodate the intentions of several parties: the specific Application Domain, the individual user, the 
machine administrator and the enterprise or organization in which the computer exists [3, 9]. Respectively, the 
policy levels are referred to as the App Domain, User, and Machine and Enterprise levels. While the three former 
levels are specified and managed by users and administrators, the Application Domain level is computed 
automatically per Application Domain at runtime. Although the policy levels are organized in a hierarchy, the 
policy levels are intersected to produce a policy for the specific context in which an assembly is being run. Each 
policy level suggests what permission sets should be granted to a specific assembly, but only the permissions 
suggested by all four levels are finally granted. The hierarchy comes into play when a code group in one level 
has the “Level Final” attribute set. This attribute causes the permission sets in policy levels below the level being 
evaluated to not be considered. This way, a system administrator for an enterprise can ensure that a machine 
administrator or individual user can not override the denying or granting of certain permission sets. 
Each policy level contains a code group hierarchy, a list of named permission sets used in the hierarchy, 
and a list of fully trusted assemblies [9]. The list of fully trusted assemblies is necessary so as not to cause 
recursion during policy resolution; the classes used in the policy levels need to be loaded from assemblies, which 
again will cause the security policy resolution to initiate unless explicitly fully trusted. 
By default, the Enterprise and User policy levels have empty code group hierarchies, except for an all-
catching code group granting the Full Trust permission set. The AppDomain policy level only exists if an 
application has specifically set one. Only the Machine policy level has a default code group hierarchy that 
contains anything more than a root node. The result, by default, is that only the contents of the Machine level 
policy are considered during policy resolution.  
 
15. Policy Management 
The Policy Manager is responsible for assigning permissions to assemblies based on the security policies in 
place. Based on the permission set granted, the Policy Manager may not let the assembly continue through to the 
Execution Engine components. The Policy Manager takes three different inputs: the evidence from the assembly 
metadata and host environment, the security policies (Enterprise, Machine, User, AppDomain ), and the 
declarative permission requests found in the assembly metadata [4, 7]. 
Evidence comes in two forms: trusted evidence and un-trusted evidence. Trusted evidence is evidence 
that has either been provided by the host environment (the host environment is assumed to be trustworthy), or 
that the CLR has been able to verify, like an assembly’s Strong Name or an Authenticode signature. Un-trusted 
evidence is evidence which originates from the assembly and which has not been verified by the CLR in some 
way. The default security policy for Microsoft’s CLR does not consider un-trusted evidence in its policy 
resolution. To compute a security policy valid for the current assembly, the Policy Manager evaluates each 
policy level individually, before computing the intersection of the four policies (or three if no AppDomain level 
policy exists). The resulting policy describes the maximum set of permissions the Policy Manager will grant the 
assembly. Requests for permissions other than those granted by the policy will be denied. Declarative permission 
requests are evaluated by the Policy Manager to determine whether the assembly will be able to execute at all. 
These requests give information on the following [9]: 
• Permissions the assembly does not wish to be granted. 
• Permissions the assembly would like, but does not need for basic operation. 
• Permissions the assembly must have to be able to execute properly. 
 
If the minimum set of permissions required by the assembly is not a subset of the maximum set of permissions 
the Policy Manager has computed from the security policy, the assembly will not be able to execute. In this case, 
the Policy Manager will cease the parsing of the assembly, and will not allow it to enter the Execution Engine by 
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throwing Policy Exception. There is another situation where the Policy Manager may not let the assembly 
continue to the Execution Engine: if the assembly is not granted the right to execute. This right to execute can be 
denied under conditions where the security policy resolves the assembly’s permission set to not contain an 
instance of Security Permission with the Execution flag set. Again, Policy Exception is thrown, and the Policy 
Manager will not let the assembly continue to the Execution Engine. Once the set of granted permissions has 
been computed, and the cases where Policy Exception may have been thrown have been passed, the Policy 
Manager associates the granted permission set with the in-memory data structures that represent the assembly 
contents, and passes control onto the Execution Engine through the Class Loader. 
 
Conclusions 
• The primary unit of a .NET application is the assembly, which includes an assembly manifest. The assembly 
manifest describes the assembly and one or more modules, and the modules contain the source code for the 
application. 
• A .NET executable is stored as an IL file. When loaded, the assembly is checked against the security policy of 
the local system. If it is allowed to run, the first assembly is loaded into memory and compiled into native binary 
code, where it is stored for the remainder of the program’s execution. 
• The .NET Framework is a virtual machine execution environment which accommodates object-oriented cross-
platform software development. It bases its security on the principles of CAS, which uses evidence about the 
executing assemblies and a four-level security policy to grant permissions to the assemblies.  
• Security checks can be applied imperatively or declaratively. Declarative security is applied by associating 
attribute declarations that specify a security action with classes or methods. Imperative security is applied by 
calling the appropriate methods of a Permission object that represents the Principal (for role-based security) or 
system resource (for code access security). 
• We can use declarative security to request permissions for the entire assembly. We can use the Assembly 
(assembly) directive to make a declarative security request for the entire assembly. 
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